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 Family firms have gained increasing attention in the finance and economics literatures as 
recent work has documented that founders and their families are often the dominant owners in 
publicly traded corporations. Given the prevalence of family firms, it is not surprising that a 
growing body of work has explored their impact on firm performance, often with mixed results.1  
Yet to this date, we know little about the specific mechanisms through which family 
firms affect performance or about the precise roles played by the families behind these firms.2 As 
a result, it is hard to identify the distinctive features of family firms that differentiate them from 
other corporations with concentrated ownership.3  
The objective of this paper is to shed light on two questions. First, do family 
characteristics affect firm decisions? Family heterogeneity might be fundamental to understand 
the role of families in these decisions. Second, if family characteristics indeed affect firms’ 
decision-making, what are the consequences of these decisions on firm performance?  
We evaluate these two questions in the context of firms’ top management succession 
decisions. At succession, family firms face the often tough decision of hiring a family or an 
unrelated chief executive officer (CEO). We analyze CEO transitions because succession 
decisions are likely to play a key role in determining the survival of firms and because this 
decision is likely to be influenced by the preferences of the controlling family, as arguably family 
firms tend to prefer family CEOs.  
                                                     
1 On the prevalence of family firms, see La Porta et al. 1999; Morck, et al., 2000; Claessens et al. 2002; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Pérez-González, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2004. On 
the performance of family firms, see Morck et al. 1988a and 1988b; Yermack, 1996; McConaughy et al. 
1998; Morck et al. 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Pérez-González, 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2004; 
Sraer and Thesmar (2004); Ehrhardt et al (2005). 
2 Some exceptions include Pérez-González (2003) who provides evidence on nepotism in CEO 
appointments in U.S. family firms and Bertrand et al. (2005) who explore the consequences of sibling 
rivalry in family firms in Thailand. 
3 For the impact of large shareholders in general see Shleifer and Vishny (1986 and 1997).  
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Using a unique dataset from Denmark that contains information on all limited liability 
firms in the country, we show that family characteristics have a strong predictive power in 
explaining both, the decision to hire a family or an unrelated CEO, as well as the choice of the 
family member who receives the top post.4  
We find that family CEOs are more frequently selected the larger the size of a departing 
CEO’s family, the higher the fraction of sons in the departing CEO’s children and when the 
departing CEO had only had one spouse. The magnitudes of the changes in the probability of 
observing a family succession attributable to these variables are very large. For example, firms 
where the departing CEO had three children were 7.4 percentage points —25 percent— more 
likely to undergo a family succession than firms where the departing CEO had only one child. 
More surprisingly, family successions declined from 33.7 percent for cases where the departing 
CEO had only one spouse to 24.6 percent in firms where the departing CEO had a history of 
multiple spouses, a decline of 27 percent.  
Family structure also affects who gets the top post among members of the family behind 
the family firm. In particular, there is a strong preference for children relative to spouses, parents 
or siblings in family successions. Comparing firms where the departing CEO had no children to 
those where she or he had only one child, we find that the fraction of firms that pass on control to 
children increases by 9.4 percentage points while the fraction of other relatives who get the top 
post declines by 5.1 percentage points. 
Having established that family characteristics affect firms’ succession decisions, we then 
explore the consequences of these family successions on firm performance. Given that family as 
well as firm characteristics are likely to be endogenous, we examine this question using 
instrumental variables (IV).  
                                                     
4 Herein we refer to family characteristics as the family characteristics of the departing CEO and we define 
an incoming CEO as family when the departing and incoming managers are related by blood or marriage 
and as unrelated, if not. 
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We instrument for family successions using the gender of the first-born child of a 
departing CEO. The gender of the first child is a plausible instrument for family successions 
because it affects the probability of observing a family CEO and because it is unlikely to be 
correlated with firm performance.  
Our evidence indicates that the gender of the first-born child of a departing CEO is 
strongly correlated with the decision to appoint a family CEO: the frequency of family transitions 
is 28.6 percent when the first-born child is female and it increases more than 7 percentage points 
to 35.7 percent (a 24.8 percent increase) when he is male. This difference is statistically 
significant at the one-percent level.   
We also document that prior to succession decisions, firms’ profitability, age, and size do 
not differ statistically as a function of the gender of the first child. These results indicate that it is 
unlikely that the gender of the first child affects firm performance beyond their impact on who is 
promoted to the CEO position. 
Our main finding is that family successions are significantly negatively correlated with 
changes in firm performance around CEO successions. The relationship between family 
successions and firm performance is extremely strong: family CEOs cause an average decline in 
firm profitability on assets of at least 6 percentage points. 
We then compare our results to those obtained using a difference-in-differences (DD) 
approach. We show that DD estimates provide robust empirical support for the notion that family 
successions hurt performance, yet the estimated coefficient on the negative effect of family CEOs 
is significantly lower than the one found using IVs. We posit that our results point to an important 
bias in OLS estimates, as family CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the helm of corporations 
when firms’ prospects are positive. We also test for differences in pre or post-CEO transition 
changes in performance and we fail to find significant differences across groups in periods where 
CEO transitions do not occur, bolstering the case for the causal interpretation of our findings.  
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We examine whether industry characteristics that might be associated to differential costs 
of employing a “professional” rather than a family CEO affect our findings. Presumably, 
managerial skills are more valuable in rapidly changing or innovative economic environments. 
We find that family CEOs tend to be costlier in fast growing industries, in sectors with significant 
firm entry, as well as in environments with relatively higher levels of research and development.  
An alternative way to interpret our analysis is that it provides a clean test of the direct 
effect of professional CEOs on firm performance. An ideal laboratory to test professional CEOs’ 
worth would be to randomly assign individuals from the general population and professional 
managers to the CEO position, and then compare their outcomes. This is close to what the 
instrumental variables estimator does: it compares the performance of firms with an unrelated 
CEO to the performance of firms that promote a family member only because the departing 
CEO’s first-born child was male. If unrelated CEOs were valuable, then the performance of the 
former firms should exceed the latter, which is indeed what we find. Professional CEOs seem to 
provide extremely valuable services to the organizations they work for. 
An additional advantage of our empirical approach is that we do not need to take a stand 
on which firms are family firms and which others are not, a common source of debate in the 
literature. We allow the data to identify the firms where family characteristics, such as, the gender 
of a first child, have a bearing on succession decisions.  
Our focus on the interaction between family characteristics and economic decisions 
relates to the seminal work of Becker (1991), and to the large body of work in economics that 
links the gender of offspring to various economic decisions (see for example, Angrist and Evans, 
1998; Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Dahl and Moretti, 2004, Bertrand et al 2005, among others). 
Our evidence that family succession decisions favor first-born males is consistent with fathers’ 
preference for boys in other settings (Dahl and Moretti, 2004). Yet parental preference over male 
children would presumably predict higher family involvement and superior performance when 
first-male children are in control, which is not supported empirically. 
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Overall, our results cast doubt on the benefits of promoting a CEO from within the ranks 
of the controlling family of a corporation. These findings are important for the governance of 
both public and private firms around the world. Controlling families that enjoy the private 
benefits of control might select a family CEO even when performance is negatively affected as a 
result. Other stakeholders, from minority shareholders to creditors or workers, might not share in 
these benefits and would therefore be negatively affected by family successions.  
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section summarizes prior work on the role of 
founders and their families. Section II describes the data and presents summary statistics.  Section 
III outlines our empirical strategy. Section IV presents the results and Section V concludes. 
 
I. Existing Literature  
 
Family and Family-Heir Firms: Prevalence and Performance 
 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) have previously shown that the 
Berle and Means (1932) corporation with separated ownership and control is, in practice, not 
widespread.  Even in the United States, families own and control a significant number of publicly 
held firms. Family ownership (founders and descendants) is present in 35 (37) percent of firms in 
the Standard and Poor’s (Fortune) 500, where families hold an average of 18 (16) percent of 
shares (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2004). 
Outside the United States, evidence of ownership concentration by La Porta et al. (1999) 
indicates that families control over 53 percent of publicly traded firms with at least $500 million 
in market capitalization in 27 countries.  Additional evidence of the prominent role of families in 
public firms is provided by Morck et al. (2000) for Canada, Claessens et al. (2002) for East Asian 
countries, and Faccio and Lang (2002) for Western Europe. The role of families in privately held 
firms is, presumably, even larger. 
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 From a theoretical perspective it is unclear whether family CEOs should have a positive 
impact on firm performance (Donnelley, 1964). For example, family members could perform 
better than other CEOs because they face steeper incentive schemes: In addition to monetary 
rewards, they derive significant personal satisfaction from the success of the organization (Davis, 
et al. 1997; Palia and Ravid, 2002) and face higher levels of shame or guilt in case of failure 
(Kandel and Lazear, 1992).  Also, the trust and loyalty established with key stakeholders might be 
more easily transferred to family executives (Donnelley, 1964). An additional benefit of family 
members is that, by virtue of having grown up close to the day-to-day business of the 
organization, they might be more knowledgeable than outsiders about the firm (Donnelley, 1964).  
However, there are also strong reasons to believe that family CEOs might deliver worse 
performance than professional managers (Christiansen, 1953; Kepner, 1983). First, outsiders are a 
self selected group of individuals with significant managerial expertise and presumably, with an 
established record on their competence (Pérez-Gonzalez, 2003). Second, family CEOs, even if 
competent, might be affected by the potential conflicts between family and business norms with 
regard to the allocation of management positions, executive pay or other resources (Levinson, 
1971; Barnes and Hershon, 1976; Lansberg, 1983).  
To date, several studies have empirically examined the impact of founders and their 
families on performance. Regarding the role of founders, Johnson, et al. (1985) find that sudden 
deaths of founder-CEOs are associated with large stock price increases, which suggests that 
founder CEOs hindered performance. Yet, Slovin and Sushka (1993), in analyzing deaths of large 
shareholders, find that founder status does not have a significant effect in explaining abnormal 
returns. They do, however, find that the death of CEOs with concentrated ownership is associated 
with positive abnormal returns and with substantial subsequent control activity, which is 
consistent with entrenchment.  
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 Yermack (1996) finds that founding family CEOs are negatively correlated with market 
to book (M-B) ratios. In contrast, other studies find a positive impact of founder-CEOs. 
McConaughy et al. (1998) find a positive impact of founding family CEOs on M-B ratios. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) find a positive correlation between founding family ownership and 
profitability and M-B ratios, and conditional on family ownership, a positive correlation between 
these measures and family CEOs. Adams et al. (2003) instrument for the presence of founder 
CEOs using the number of founders alive and find a positive founder effect on performance. 
More related to our paper is the literature that evaluates the impact of family heirs on firm 
performance. Morck et al. (1988) find a positive and significant correlation between founding 
family management and market to book (M-B) ratios for young firms (where the founder is more 
likely to be in charge) but a negative correlation for old firms in their sample (where heirs are 
more likely to be CEOs). In their sample of Canadian firms, Morck et al. (2000) find lower 
operating performance for family CEOs who inherit their positions. Pérez-González (2003) finds 
drastic declines in M-B and firm profitability around successions when family members but not 
unrelated executives take control. Villalonga and Amit (2004) find that founding families 
enhance M-B valuations only when founders are active in the corporation but hurt valuations in 
descendant CEOs firms. Bloom and Van Reenen (2005) find that family firms under the 
management of a first-born male in France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States are 
negatively correlated to “best” managerial practices. In contrast, Sraer and Thesmar (2004) find a 
positive correlation between heir-controlled firms and profitability in France.  
A common drawback of profitability or M-B based tests on heir or family performance is 
that family status is not randomly determined, and as a result, inference is problematic. Our paper 
improves on this literature by using an instrumental variable approach that allows us to alleviate 
endogeneity and omitted variable concerns. 
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 The Role of the Family behind the Family Firm 
 
Given the prevalence of family firms and their alleged effects on performance, it is 
surprising how little we know about the specific mechanisms behind these correlations and 
especially how they interact with the controlling family characteristics. There are, however, a few 
exceptions.  
Pérez-González (2003) shows a strong correlation between the decline in performance in 
family-heir managed firms and the quality of the undergraduate institution attended by family 
CEOs. In particular, he finds large declines in performance for firms with a family CEO that 
attended relatively “non-selective” undergraduate institutions. Further, he finds no such an effect 
in the pool of unrelated managers. His findings show that nepotism might be at the core of the 
difference in performance. Also, given that he explores changes in performance, his results are 
robust to time-invariant firm characteristics that might affect the relative performance of family 
CEOs. Yet his empirical strategy might not distinguish between heir attributes (college attended) 
and unobserved changes in performance that could correlate with the choice of CEO. 
An alternative approach to explore the impact of families on firm performance that might 
be less prone to the omitted variables and endogeneity concerns is to use family characteristics as 
a source of variation. In this regard, Bertrand et al. (2005) show a negative correlation between 
firm profitability and the number of male descendants, which is potentially explained by sibling 
rivalry. An important shortcoming of this approach is that it implicitly assumes that family traits 
are exogenous to firms’ outcomes. However, there is a large literature showing that family 
characteristics are also choice variables that respond to economic circumstances (Becker, 1991). 
In the remaining sections we examine the role of families’ characteristics on CEO 
succession decisions and then evaluate the consequences of family successions on firm 
performance. We extend on existing work on the effect of family characteristics on decision-
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making by focusing the bulk of our empirical analysis on family characteristics that are likely to 
be exogenous to firms’ characteristics. We also improve on the literature on the performance 
effects of family relative to unrelated successions by using these exogenous family characteristics 
as instrumental variables. Our data and empirical strategy are explained in the following sections. 
 
II. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 
II.A. Data Sources and Sample Selection 
 
We constructed a dataset with 9,511 successions in limited liability (publicly and 
privately held) firms in Denmark between 1994 and 2002. Our dataset contains financial 
information on firms, as well as personal and family information about the departing and 
incoming chief executive officers. This dataset was constructed based on three different sources 
as explained below:  
Financial and management information are from Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau 
(KOB). KOB is a dataset assembled by a private firm (with the same name) based primarily on 
the annual reports that all limited liability firms are required to file with the Danish Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs. The dataset contains selected accounting and management 
information of the universe of limited liability companies in Denmark. Local regulations mandate 
disclosure of firms’ assets and measures of firm profitability such as operating or net income, yet 
to protect firms’ market position they do not require them to report sales. Management data 
reported includes the names and position of executives and board members. We obtained access 
to management information from 1994 to 2002 and financial data from 1991 to 2003. Even 
though a large fraction of KOB firms are privately held, KOB data are likely to be reliable as 
Danish corporate law requires annual reports to be approved by external accountants.  
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 Individual and family data about departing and incoming CEOs are from the Danish Civil 
Registration System (CPR). These official records include the personal identification number 
(CPR), (equivalent to the U.S. social security number), the name, gender, date of birth and death 
of all Danish individuals.  In addition, these records contain the names and CPR numbers of 
parents, siblings, and children, as well as, the individual’s marital history (number of marriages, 
divorces, and widowhoods). We use these data to construct CEOs’ family trees and to identify 
whether departing and incoming CEOs are related by blood or marriage. 
To match the names of top management reported in KOB to their CPR numbers, which 
are needed to access their individual and family information in the Danish Civil Registration 
System, we use a database from the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency (Erhvervs- og 
Selskabsstyrelsen or E&S), at the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. The E&S dataset 
reports both the names and CPR numbers of management and board members of all limited 
liability corporations.5  Under Danish corporate law firms are required to file to E&S any change 
in the CEO or board positions within two weeks of the actual date of occurrence.6
We report a CEO succession when four conditions are met. First, based on data from 
KOB the departing (entering) CEO had been (stayed) in his/her position for at least two years. 
Second, CEO names were matched with their relevant CPR number using E&S. Third we 
required that matching financial information from KOB was available around CEO transitions. 
Fourth, we retained one succession per firm. 
 
 
                                                     
5 We compare the name of a manager in KOB with all possible names of managers and board members in 
E&S for the particular firm in question rather than with the population of managers and boars members. 
This reduces the potential for incorrect matches arising from multiple individuals having the same name. 
6 We match around 90 percent of all managers involved in successions.  In addition, despite the fact that it 
is common in Denmark for women to change their name when they marry, we match both men and women 
equally well.  The reason is that we use women’s family trees to reconstruct their maiden names as well as 
other names they had in previous marriages. 
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II.B. Summary Statistics 
 
Firm Characteristics 
 
Table I presents summary statistics of the firms in the sample both as a group (Column I), 
and when we classify them by the family links between the departing and incoming CEOs: family 
(Column II), when the incoming CEO is related by blood or marriage to the departing CEO and 
unrelated (Column III), otherwise. 
Not surprisingly, firms that undergo family successions are relatively smaller than those 
firms that select unrelated CEOs. The difference in the natural logarithm of total assets is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  On average, family succession firms had Danish 
Krone 12.7 million (not reported) or USD $2.1 million in assets.7  In contrast, firms that selected 
an unrelated CEO had Danish Krone 15.1 million or around USD$ 2.5 million in assets.   
We present three measures of firm profitability: the ratio of operating income or earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) to the book value of assets, the ratio of net income to assets, and 
the industry adjusted EBIT to assets level, which is calculated using the average of the relevant 
firms’ four-digit NACE (European industry classification system) benchmark. All measures show 
that firms that promoted a family CEO were more profitable per dollar of assets than those firms 
that selected an unrelated CEO and that the difference across groups is economically and 
statistically significant. Based on operating income, firms that promoted a family CEO were 1.4 
percentage points (34 percent) more profitable than firms that appointed an unrelated CEO.  
In Table I, we also present the age of firms in the sample. We find that firms undergoing 
CEO successions have, on average, 18 years of existence. We find no statistical difference in firm 
age across types of CEOs.  
                                                     
7 The exchange at the time of writing was equivalent to 6 Krone per U.S. dollar. 
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Table I highlights the fact that, when we take a comprehensive view of firms in an 
economy, family successions are likely to occur in relatively smaller and more profitable firms. 
The marked difference between these firms and those that promote unrelated CEOs indicates that 
CEO succession decisions might not be random. As a result, it is not obvious that family or 
unrelated CEOs might be a fair counterfactual for each other observed succession. 
 
Family Characteristics and CEO Succession Decisions 
 
In Table II we explore the correlation between family characteristics and the choice of 
incoming CEO. We present the number and fraction of CEO successions when classified as 
family (Columns II and III) or unrelated (Columns IV and V) successions. Also, we further 
decompose family successions into family-children transitions when the incoming CEO is a 
family CEO and a child of the departing CEO (Columns VI and VII). 
Overall, family successions occur in 2,980 out of 9,511 CEO successions in our sample 
(31.3 percent). Column VI shows that 1,229 (41 percent) family successions involve the children 
of the departing CEO. Given the large fraction of privately held firms in our data, the fraction of 
family transitions might appear low. However, according to La Porta et al. (1998) Denmark is 
among the highest-ranked countries in terms of “rule of law” (10 out of 10 in their measure), 
which might reduce the expropriation potential by unrelated CEOs and, as a result, diminish the 
relative attractiveness of family CEOs (Burkart et al. 2003).  
In Table II, Panel A we show the frequency of family successions conditional on the 
number of children of the departing CEO. We find that the frequency of family successions 
increases with the number of children. It rises from 29.1 percent for departing executives with 
one child to 36.5 percent for departing executives with 3 children. The associated difference of 
7.4 percentage points is significant at the one-percent level and it represents an increase in the 
probability of a family transition of 25.4 percent. In addition, we find that the rate of increase in 
this frequency decreases in the number of children.  
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It is important to highlight that, although Panel A shows a strong pattern between the 
number of children and the probability of family successions, it is difficult to interpret these 
correlations as causal since larger families and family successions might be determined by 
omitted variables. For example, a preference for a close family could explain the correlation of 
family size and family CEOs.  
Table II also shows that the structure of the family could also affect the choice of CEO 
inside the family. In particular, family firms seem to have a preference for children relative to 
spouses, parents or siblings at the time of succession. In Table II Panel A, we observe that family 
transitions account for 24.8 and 29.1 percent of all successions when the departing CEO has no 
children or one child, respectively. Yet, the number of children promoted to the top executive 
position increases from 0 (by construction) to 9.4 percent of all observations. In other words, the 
frequency with which other family members are promoted to the CEO position decreases from 
24.8 percent of all cases when the CEO had no children to 19.7 percent when he or she had one 
child. That is, children crowd out other members of the family. 
In Panel B we document that the marital history of CEOs can potentially affect both the 
choice of family or unrelated CEOs and whether children arrive to the CEO position. We show 
that family successions seem to be less common in firms in which the outgoing CEO had no 
spouse than in firms in which they had exactly one spouse. This could simply reflect the fact that 
the pool of potential family candidates is larger when the outgoing CEO has a spouse.  
More interestingly, the frequency of family transitions decreases for CEOs that, at the 
time of succession, had been associated with more than one spouse. For this group, it is 9.1 
percentage points or 27 percent lower than for firms where the departing CEO has had only one 
spouse, a difference that is significant at the one-percent level. Column VII shows that more than 
75 percent of this difference (7.1 out of 9.1) is attributable to fewer children arriving to the CEO 
position. These correlations suggest that exploring the impact of family conflicts on firm 
performance might be an interesting topic in its own right.  
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In Table II Panel C, we explore the correlation between the ratio of male to total number 
of children and successions decisions. We report that firms in which more than 50 percent of the 
outgoing CEO’s children are male are 8.7 percentage points more likely to have a family 
successor than firms in which less than 50 percent of the outgoing CEOs children are male. This 
difference is significant at the one-percent level. A drawback of this ratio is that it is partly 
endogenous as individuals can affect its variance through their choice of family size (it converges 
to 50 percent as the number of children increases). In contrast, the exogenous component of this 
ratio is the gender of the first child, which is determined by nature. 
 
The Gender of the First-Born Child 
 
To explore whether family characteristics might have a causal impact on the probability 
of observing a family succession we report in Table II Panel D, the correlation between a family 
trait that is likely to be random and the decision to promote a family CEO. We argue that the 
gender of the first-born child of a departing CEO is likely to be randomly assigned. This is likely 
to be the case for departing CEOs in the sample, as over 80 percent of them had their first child 
prior to 1980, before current techniques to identify the gender of children were widespread.  
Table II, Panel D shows that outgoing executives whose first-born child is male are 7.1 
percentage points more likely to leave the firm to a family member than their counterparts whose 
first-born child is female. The difference between these two groups is significant at the one-
percent level. Moreover, Column VII shows that the difference in the frequency with which the 
outgoing CEO’s children get the top position increases by 8.7 percentage points, also significant 
at the one-percent level. Once more, these numbers indicate that children crowd out other 
relatives: the frequency of non-children family CEOs declines from 18.2 percent when the 
outgoing CEO’s first-born child is female to 16.7 percent when he is male.  
 14
These correlations confirm anecdotal evidence that male children are preferred to females 
at the time of succession or that primogeniture inheritance rules are still followed even in a 
developed country like Denmark. The magnitude of the difference (24.8 percent) might appear 
large given that Denmark is a country with a high overall level of gender equality (it ranks fourth 
among 58 countries according to data from the World Economic Forum) and one of the highest 
female labor force participation rates in the world.8 Nevertheless, these numbers are consistent 
with the low levels of female participation among top management positions in Denmark. In 
2004, the fraction of women among top managers was only 25 percent compared with 61 percent 
in intermediate level positions.9
Having established that firm characteristics affect both (1) the decision to name a family 
CEO, and (2) who within a family gets the CEO position, we turn to describing our empirical 
strategy to investigate the consequences of family successions on firm performance. 
 
III. Empirical strategy 
 
III.A. Difference in differences 
 
A simple way to evaluate the impact of family CEOs on performance is to estimate the 
change (difference) in firm profitability around CEO successions, and assess the way in which 
firms’ outcomes have changed as a result. This statistic is attractive because it provides an 
estimate of the impact of CEOs on performance that is not affected by firms’ time-invariant 
characteristics. However, a drawback of this approach is that it can potentially fail to control for 
aggregate changes in performance that are due to, for example, macroeconomic trends, or 
succession-specific patterns in performance. Two common fixes to this problem are (a) adjusting 
the measures of profitability using industry benchmarks, and (b) using a difference-in-differences 
                                                     
8 See http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competitiveness_Reports/Reports/gender_gap.pdf for statistics 
on gender inequality and 2001 Statistical Yearbook published by Danish Statistics for cross country 
comparison on women’s labor force participation. 
9 See http://www.dst.dk/HomeUK/Statistics/ofs/Publications/Yearbook (Table 136). 
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analysis by comparing the changes in performance of firms that name a family member to the 
CEO position to those of other firms that experience a succession by unrelated CEOs.  
We start by performing a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis on the relative 
performance of family and unrelated CEOs as described below: 
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where the subscript 1 denotes the equation number.  is the difference in performance estimated 
using the three-year average before and after CEO transitions.  is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the incoming CEO is family and zero if unrelated. Under the null that all CEOs are 
equally talented would not be different from zero. 
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III.B. Instrumental Variables 
 
A shortcoming of implementing a DD analysis is that it requires that the program to be 
evaluated not be implemented based on differences in outcomes (Bertrand et al. 2004). In our 
setting, this requirement implies that the decision of naming a family or an unrelated CEO be 
uncorrelated to firms’ determinants of performance. This assumption appears to be a strong one. 
To overcome this problem we use instrumental variables (IVs).  
 
An example 
 
To illustrate the potential drawbacks of a DD approach and the advantages of using IVs 
in this setting, we use the following example: 
Suppose that post succession performance is given by Q + I, where Q is the quality of the 
firm’s new projects, and I is related to the identity of the successor.  CEO successions can be of 
two types: family or unrelated.  Let I=f when the incoming CEO is related to the outgoing CEO 
and I=u when the incoming CEO is unrelated.  We are, therefore, interested in estimating f-u. 
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Suppose further that there is heterogeneity in the quality of firms’ new projects around 
succession decisions that the econometrician cannot observe or perfectly control for.  
Specifically, the quality of a firm’s new projects can be high (qH), medium (qM), or low (qL) each 
with probability one third.  
The DD estimator would yield f-u directly if family and unrelated CEOs were randomly 
assigned to firms. To make the example interesting, however, and in the spirit of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998), suppose that the better the quality of the firm’s investment opportunities, the 
more likely the departing CEO is to choose a family successor. Also, suppose that, as suggested 
by Table II, the likelihood of a family succession is higher when the CEO’s first-born child is 
male.  The following table illustrates an example of a decision rule that satisfies these conditions: 
 
Opportunities Male Female
High Family CEO Family CEO
( q H +f ) ( q H +f )
Medium Family CEO Unrelated CEO
( q M +f ) ( q M +u )
Low Unrelated CEO Unrelated CEO
( q L +u ) ( q L +u )
Investment
Gender of First Child
 
 
Under such decision rule, family (unrelated) successions would never occur under low 
(high) quality of new projects and thus the DD estimate would reflect not only the true effect of 
family CEOs but also a selection bias, which would then be incorrectly attributed to CEO talent. 
In consequence, the DD estimate in this example would have an upward bias.10  Graphically, the 
DD estimator compares the changes in performance of family successions, which would tend to 
occur in the upper part of the table above, to unrelated successions, which would tend to happen 
in the lower part of that table. 
                                                     
10 It is easy to see that a selection bias in the DD estimator would exist as long as the decision to appoint a 
family CEO is not orthogonal to other determinants of firm performance. Using the example above, the 
sign of the bias would change depending on the correlation of family CEOs and investment prospects.  
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 The IV approach, in contrast, starts by using information on all CEO successions 
conditional on the gender of the first-born child and then compares the outcome of CEO 
successions as a function of the instrument. Intuitively, this is equivalent to comparing the 
outcomes of all CEO transitions in the table above and calculating the difference in performance 
across columns. 
In the previous example, if (a) the quality of new projects is high, all firms promote a 
family CEO regardless on the gender of the first child, (b) if the quality of new projects is low, all 
firms promote an unrelated CEO, regardless of the gender of the first child, and (c) if the quality 
of new projects is medium, those firms with a male first child would promote a family CEO while 
those with a female first child would promote an unrelated CEO. (a) and (b) imply that, if the 
quality of the firm’s new projects is either high or low, both the male and female groupings are 
identical and therefore these observations cancel each other out when the difference between 
groupings is performed.  
As a result, in this example, the IV estimator uses only the information of the group with 
medium investment prospects. This is a general result: estimates from instrumental variables use 
only the information of the group of firms that respond to them (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). We 
can also see in the table that the IV estimator is not contaminated by differences in investment 
opportunities, which are constant for all firms in the moderate category. 
The example above highlights the advantages of using instrumental variables, namely, 
that this method is explicit about the source of variation used to estimate the relative impact of 
family and unrelated CEOs, and that this variation is arguably orthogonal to firms’ prospects. 
Yet, it also points to a potential concern in interpreting the estimated results: they are only based 
on a sub-sample of firms which are affected by the instrument. Specifically, they are based on the 
firms that get a family (unrelated) CEO only because the first-born child was male (female). 
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Instrumental Variables Estimation Framework 
 
We use the gender of the first-born child of a departing CEO of a corporation to 
instrument for whether a firm will be managed in the next succession by a family CEO. 
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As before, is an indicator variable equal to one if the incoming CEO is related 
by blood or marriage to the departing CEO and zero otherwise. Here genderfirst is an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if the first child is male and 0 if female. Note that even though 
 is a dichotomous variable, we estimate (2) using ordinary least squares (OLS) since a 
probit or a logit first stage can harm the consistency of the estimates (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). 
The second stage equation estimates the impact of family successions on changes in firm 
performance:  
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We estimate (3) using two-stage least squares (TSLS). We are interested in c3, which 
captures the direct effect of a family succession on changes in performance. 
 
Sorting by the Gender of the First-Born Child: Firm and Family Characteristics 
 
As we previously argued, we think that the gender of the first child born to the departing 
CEO of a corporation is likely to be a valid instrument for family transitions as, historically, a 
first-born male is more likely to receive inheritances (primogeniture rule), one of which might be 
the helm of the family firm. Panel D in Table II shows that this historical pattern holds true for 
the case of Denmark. We also posit that it is hard to make the case that firms’ prospects are 
directly related to the gender of the first child of the CEO.  
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 In Table III we present firm and family characteristics by the gender of the first-born 
child of a departing CEO as an initial test for whether this variable is directly correlated with firm 
or family characteristics beyond its effect on succession decisions.  
At the time of transition, we find no difference in terms of firm size, operating 
profitability and net income between those firms whose departing CEO had a male first child and 
those whose first child was female. Table III stands in stark contrast to Table I in which we found 
significant differences in firm characteristics for family and unrelated transitions. 
One concern of the above-described instrumental variable is that families with a strong 
preference for male children and whose first-born child is female would tend to be larger in size 
than their male first-child counterparts. As a result, the gender of a first child would be correlated 
with family size, which in turn might affect firm performance. To assess the relevance of this 
potential channel, Table III presents the average number of children born to departing CEOs. It 
shows that, conditional on having at least one child, the average number of children is 2.2 
irrespective of the gender of the first child. In short, we find no evidence that the gender of the 
first child affects family size. 
Alternatively, and given the evidence from Dahl and Moretti (2004) who document 
differential marriage rate as a function of the gender of children (larger for males), male first-
children might affect the departing CEOs’ marriage decisions and potentially firms’ prospects. If 
this effect were present in this sample, the IV strategy would be incorrectly attributing this effect 
to CEO talent. However, the last line of Table III shows that the number of spouses is not 
statistically different for departing CEOs with female or male first children. 
In sum, based on Table III we find no evidence that firm characteristics or family size 
differ as a function of our instrument. This “no difference” table bolsters our confidence that the 
gender of the first child of a departing CEO is likely to be uncorrelated to firms’ prospects. 
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IV. Results 
 
IV.A.  Difference-in-Differences 
 
To analyze the relative performance of family CEOs, we first examine changes in firm 
performance of both family and unrelated CEO around CEO transitions using a difference-in-
differences approach.  
Following the CEO turnover literature (Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson et al. 2004) and 
prior work on family CEO transitions (Pérez-González, 2003), Table IV, Panel A presents 
measures of operating profitability relative to assets. To control for common industry time-trends 
the measures are adjusted using the average of the relevant four-digit NACE industry. The 
measures are three-year average profitability for all firms before and after CEO transitions.  
Column I in Table IV indicates that firms that experience CEO transitions, on average, 
exhibit lower profitability relative to their industry peers before succession. This average is 
significant at the one-percent level. After transitions, the firms in the sample do not significantly 
improve their performance.  
When we compare the profitability levels prior to the transitions for family and unrelated 
successions (Columns II and III, respectively), we find that family successions tend to occur in 
firms with above-average profitability while unrelated successions tend to happen in firms with 
below average performance. Prior to CEO transitions, the difference in profitability between these 
groupings is economically and statistically significant at conventional levels and it is equivalent 
to 1.4 percentage points relative to assets, as shown in Column IV 
Given that, as suggested by Table I, firms that promote family CEOs are likely to differ 
relative to those that select unrelated CEOs, we proceed to compare the within group change in 
performance around transitions. Within firm variation allows us to control for both observable 
and unobservable time-invariant characteristics that might affect firms’ profitability.  
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We find that firms that promote family CEOs experience a decline in profitability of 1.1 
percentage points. This difference is statistically significant at the one-percent level. In contrast, 
firms that promote external CEOs undergo improvements in profitability of 0.2 percentage points, 
an increase that is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels (t-statistic of 1.4). 
As a result, the average difference-in-differences (DD) suggests that family successions 
are associated with 1.35 percentage points lower performance relative to unrelated successions. 
This decline is equivalent to 25 percent of the average unadjusted operating income to assets. The 
estimated gap in profitability is similar in magnitude to the one found by Pérez-González (2003) 
in publicly traded firms that promote family over unrelated CEOs in the United States. 
In Table IV, panel B, we further investigate the gap in performance associated to family 
CEOs using alternative measures of profitability. In each row we present the difference in 
average profitability for family and unrelated transitions, respectively, as well as the mean 
difference-in-differences estimator. In addition we report the median difference-in-difference. 
We show changes in three measures of performance: (1) operating income to assets, (2) 
industry-adjusted operating income to assets (used in Panel A) and (3) industry-adjusted net 
income over assets. The results confirm the patterns presented in Panel A. Namely, firms that 
promote family CEOs undergo significant declines in profitability while the profitability of firms 
that promote unrelated CEOs is marginally higher or unchanged, but not statistically different 
from zero at conventional levels. In every case, however, the mean difference-in-differences 
estimator is negative and statistically different from zero. The results obtained using median 
regressions yield similar findings and indicate that these differences in performance are not 
driven by outliers. 
To further investigate the improvements in profitability associated with unrelated CEOs 
we also present a difference-in-differences estimator on the natural logarithm of total assets. The 
results indicate that unrelated successors increase the asset base by more than family successors.  
Together with the results on profitability, these patterns indicate that unrelated CEOs increase 
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operating income more than proportionally to their increase in assets, and that the gains in 
operating performance are not explaining by differential reductions in the asset base. 
While the above-described patterns in performance shows that family transitions are 
correlated with lower profitability relative to unrelated transitions, it is difficult to establish 
causality. The decision to appoint a family CEO is unlikely to be taken randomly irrespective of 
firms business prospects. In consequence, the result might be explained by unobserved 
differences in investment opportunities even when there is no differential performance between 
family and unrelated CEOs.  For example, it is possible that outside CEOs are promoted when a 
recovery in performance is in sight.  Another possibility is that performance is mean reverting and 
that departing CEOs can only name a family heir after an abnormally profitable year. 
Alternatively, the DD estimator might underestimate the true decline in performance 
associated with family successions if related CEOs are promoted to the helm in firms with 
relatively superior prospects. If that were the case, the true effect of family succession would be 
even more damaging to firm performance. To address these concerns we now turn to explore the 
impact of family successions on firm performance using instrumental variables.  
 
IV. B. Instrumental Variables 
 
First stage 
 
Table V presents the first stage relationship between the gender of the departing CEO’s 
first-born child and the type of succession. Consistent with Table II, having a male first child is 
strongly positively correlated family CEOs. We find that firms whose departing CEO had a male 
first child are 7.1 percentage points more likely to observe a family succession relative to those 
that had a female first child, a difference that is statistically significant at the one-percent level. In 
economic terms, it implies an increase in the probability of observing a family succession of 25 
percent. Moreover, the F-statistic equal to 48 suggests that the gender of the first child is unlikely 
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to be a weak-instrument and as a result, the IV estimates are unlikely to be biased towards those 
of OLS (Bound et al. 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock and Watson, 2003). 
Even though the number of male children is likely to be an endogenous variable, in 
Column II we examine its effect on family transitions. The coefficient is significant at the one-
percent level and it also economically significant: An additional son increases the probability of a 
family transition by 5.4 percentage points.  
In Table V we also present alternative specifications including firm characteristics such 
as firm size and year dummies (Column III), and additionally, firm age and firm profitability 
(Column IV). As it was suggested in Table I, first stage results show that family successions tend 
to occur in smaller and more profitable firms relative to those that promote unrelated CEOs. 
Results also indicate that older firms are more likely to undergo a family transition. 
In Column V of Table V, we present first-stage results when using both the gender of the 
first-born child and the number of male children as instrumental variables for family successions. 
Not surprisingly, the economic relevance of the gender of the first child indicator variable is 
significantly reduced as this variable is strongly positively correlated with the number of male 
children. Yet it continues to be significant at the five-percent level.  
 
Reduced form 
 
Having established the strong impact of the gender of the first child on the probability of 
family succession, we turn to analyzing their effect on performance. We start by exploring the 
relevance of this instrument by evaluating its reduced form correlation with firms’ changes in 
firm profitability around CEO successions, our key dependent variable of interest.  
The results are presented in Table VI. We find a strong and negative correlation between 
changes in firm performance and having a CEO whose first child is male. The estimated 
coefficients show that the group of firms in which the first-born child is male experienced an 
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average performance drop around CEO transitions between 0.7 and 0.9 percentage points, relative 
to the group of firms in which the departing CEO’s first-born child is female.  
In reading the results from Table VI it is important to highlight that while the gender of 
an individual’s first child is likely to be randomly assigned, it is still possible that the timing of 
family versus unrelated CEO successions might differ in a way that could affect performance 
evaluations. However, the evidence presented in Table III suggests that firm characteristics 
conditional on the gender of the departing CEO’s first-born child are comparable: firm size, age, 
and profitability prior to CEO transitions are not statistically different from zero.  
Given that the only difference across groups is that “first child male” firms were more 
likely to experience a family transition, the result that they are undergoing large declines in 
performance should be interpreted as strong evidence that family successions hurt firm 
performance. This finding is now free from endogeneity and omitted variable concerns. Yet the 
magnitude of this difference has to be adjusted to reflect the fact that it is explained by a subset of 
the sample, i.e. the firms that were likely to be affected by the instrument. We now estimate this 
magnitude, using two-stage least squares (TSLS). 
 
Second Stage 
 
In Table VII we examine the impact of family successions on changes in performance 
around CEO successions using alternative specifications. In Column I and to ease its comparison 
to the IV estimate, we provide OLS estimates of the effect of family successions on performance 
comparable to those found in Table IV but after controlling for firm size and firm profitability 
before CEO transitions. The DD estimates suggest that firms that promote family CEOs trail 
other firms around successions by approximately 0.8 percentage points in terms of firm 
profitability. The regression in Column I uses the entire sample of successions while, for 
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comparability purposes, that in Column II uses the same sample as the IV regressions, which 
requires the outgoing CEO to have at least one child to be able to construct the instrument. 
Columns III through VII of Table VII present the estimated coefficients using IVs. As 
anticipated by Table VI, the impact of family CEOs on performance is negative and it is always 
statistically significant at conventional levels. In all cases, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient is larger than the one found using OLS, implying a reduction in profitability relative to 
unrelated transitions of at least six percentage points. These result are robust to using as 
instrument only the gender of the first-born child (Columns III and IV), and additionally the 
number of male children (Column V) and the total number of children (Column VI).11  
Given that the estimated gap in performance is extremely large and that changes in 
performance might potentially capture influential observations, we also explore the robustness of 
the results to estimating a median regression in the second stage. The estimated coefficient in 
Column VII suggests a negative impact on firm profitability of 6 percentage points, which 
indicates that outliers are not likely to account for our findings. 
The large gap between IV and OLS estimates suggests that family successions tend to 
occur when unobserved firm performance is expected to improve or alternatively, that unrelated 
CEOs tend to face more challenging environments. As a result, OLS underestimates the true 
differential in performance between family and unrelated CEOs. An alternative interpretation of 
this finding is that professional CEOs provide important services to corporations. 
 
Robustness 
 
Even though Table III provided evidence that the first child male-female groupings were 
comparable prior to succession in terms of size and profitability, a potential concern with the 
                                                     
11 Results are also robust to using both the gender of first children and the number of spouses as 
instruments as well as, to estimating our main specification in the sample of departing CEOs with only one 
spouse (results not shown). 
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results thus far presented is that we might be capturing differences in performance that could be 
attributed to a differential timing of CEO successions for family or unrelated managers. 
In Table VIII we present evidence that this is not likely to be the case. In Columns I, II 
and III, we examine whether firms that promote family CEOs experience abnormally low 
performance relative to those that promote unrelated CEOs during three different windows of 
analysis. In Column I we examine changes in performance using a window before the transition, 
estimated around year t=-3. In Column II we use estimate changes in performance in a window 
around the transition (as before), and in Column III we estimate changes in performance using a 
post-transition window of analysis, centered on year t=3. In all cases, changes in performance are 
computed as the difference in the three-year average firm profitability around the relevant year. 
We fail to find a statistically significant difference between firms that undergo family 
successions and those firms that promote unrelated CEOs in any window of analysis, except for 
the window that contains CEO transitions (Column II). The result of Column I indicates that 
performance prior to succession is not affected by the gender of the departing CEO’s first-born 
child. This result casts doubt on the idea that in the group of firms affected by the instrument, 
CEO’s time their succession differentially. In addition, the result in Column III indicates that 
firms that undergo family transitions do not recover. The lack of post-succession recovery is 
additional evidence on the permanent negative impact of family CEOs.  
In Columns IV, V and VI of Table VIII we examine the robustness of our findings on 
alternative sub-samples based on the departing CEO’s age. In Column IV we only include CEO 
transitions in which the departing CEO left the helm between 55 and 65 years of age. We find an 
estimate decline in performance of 10 percentage points, demonstrating that the patterns 
identified in Table VII are not explained by late retirements by founders. In Column V (VI) of 
Table VIII we restrict the sample to succession in which the departing CEO is younger (older) 
than the median of the firms in the sample. In both sub-samples the estimated coefficient on 
family CEO is negative. However, this coefficient is not significant in the sample of young 
 27
departing CEOs. This is to be expected as the children of younger CEOs are unlikely to be 
promoted to the CEO position and as a result the gender of the first child –the first stage– 
explains very little of the variation in CEO appointments. 
Finally, we also present results when we restrict the sample to observations in which the 
outgoing CEO dies around management transitions. In this group, the endogeneity of the timing 
of the succession is less of a concern as presumably some of these events were unexpected yet 
using our IVs is a hard test as the sample size falls dramatically. We find that even in this case, 
the estimated coefficient is negative and similar in magnitude to previous specifications, although 
its associated standard errors are much larger. 
 
Interactions with Industry Characteristics 
 
We proceed to investigate if the relative performance of family CEOs varies with 
observed industry characteristics. We focus on industry-level interactions with our instrument to 
mitigate endogeneity concerns of using firm-level characteristics. 
A natural place to start this analysis is by investigating if the gap in performance for 
family CEOs differs in industries where family CEOs are relatively more common and 
presumably better suited for their positions. To measure the relative frequency of family 
successions by industry, we create an indicator variable that takes the value of one for industries 
with above median concentration of family firms, and zero otherwise, which is then interacted 
with the gender of the first child born to a departing CEO.  
Table IX, Column I shows that while family CEO hurt performance in all settings, they 
are indeed less detrimental to firm performance (around 50 percent less harmful) in those 
industries where they are more commonly found relative to settings where they appear 
infrequently. This difference is significant at the five-percent level. Using an analogous 
specification using industry-level averages of family presence at the board, yields similar yet 
insignificant results.  
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 We hypothesize that managerial skills are potentially more valuable in certain economic 
environments, such as innovative industries and less important is mature business where 
managers might be relatively less important than, for example, firms’ established production 
processes or organizational cultures.  
As before, we first create an industry wide measure of alternatively, (1) industry maturity, 
(2) firm entry, (3) research and development (R&D) activity and (4) industry concentration, and 
then we interact these measures with our instrumental variable We classify an industry as 
“mature” if the growth rate in the value of production between 1990 and 2002 was lower than the 
median growth rate of all industries in Denmark. Similarly, industries are classified as “dynamic 
entry”, “R&D intensive” or “concentrated” if its average firm age, R&D spending between 1990 
and 2002, or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in 1992, respectively, were above the median of the 
universe of firms in Denmark, and zero otherwise.12
Table IX, Columns III to IV presents the results. In each column we present IV-TSLS 
results for family CEO and the interaction between family CEO and the above described industry 
characteristics. We find that family CEOs tend to be costlier in fast growing industries, in sectors 
with significant firm entry and in environments with substantial innovation as captured by our 
measure of R&D intensity. These patterns suggest that family CEOs are particularly damaging to 
firm performance in situations that are complex to manage. 
Finally, Column VI in Table IX shows the differential effect of family successions as a 
function of industry concentration. The result shows higher gaps in performance in relatively 
concentrated industries, where perhaps the scope for poor performance is higher as survival is 
potentially guaranteed by the lack of competition. 
 
                                                     
12 Industry level data on the value of production and spending in R&D by industry is from the OECD, 
where available. Industry concentration numbers are calculated using the shares in the book value of assets 
in an industry. Assets values and firm age are obtained from the main primary source as the key variables 
of interest.  
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 Interpretation  
 
In this paper we are explicit about the source of variation we use to examine the impact 
of family successions on firm performance. Given that the variation in the gender of the departing 
CEO’s first-born is likely to be uncorrelated to firms’ investment opportunities, the results 
demonstrate that family successions cause significant declines in firm performance.  
The findings show that qualified CEOs provide extremely valuable services to the 
organizations they work for. They also demonstrate that primogeniture rules that dictate who 
gains access to the helm of a firm based on birth order or gender, but not competence, can have 
disastrous consequences for firm performance. 
The negative effect of family CEOs on performance suggests that minority shareholders 
at family-controlled firms are likely to suffer the most under family CEOs as non-controlling 
investors do not participate in the private benefits of control. It also indicates that other 
stakeholders interacting with family firms should pay close attention to succession decisions as 
the competence gap between family and unrelated CEOs might be substantial.  
A common caveat in interpreting the estimated results using instrumental variables is that 
not every firm in the sample is affected by the IV, and as such, the results of this paper are only 
representative for those firms whose succession decisions are affected by it. In particular, one 
might posit that the sub-sample of family CEOs that are promoted due to the instrument are of a 
lower average quality relative to the pool of family CEOs that get control irrespective of it. If that 
were the case, the average causal effect of family CEOs on performance might not be as 
disastrous as the results from our instrument indicate. 
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 V. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we used a unique dataset from Denmark to investigate the inside workings 
of family firms. Our objective was to shed light on two questions: first, do family characteristics 
affect firm decisions? And second, what are the consequences of these decisions on firm 
performance? These questions were examined in the context of CEO succession decisions. 
We showed that family characteristics such as family size, the gender composition of 
children or the marital history of a family head can affect both the decision to appoint a family or 
an unrelated CEO and the identity of a family successor. 
We then used the fact that the gender of the first child born to a departing CEO is 
exogenous as an instrument for testing the impact of family successions on performance. We 
found that family CEOs had a dramatic causal impact on firm profitability: family CEOs reduced 
firm profitability on assets by at least 6 percentage points, which is significantly larger than prior 
estimates in the literature. Our findings show that addressing endogeneity concerns related to 
firms’ decisions are extremely important for understanding the role of family firms. 
The result that family CEOs hurt firm performance might suggest that countries where 
the control and management of assets is commonly transferred among kin, can potentially under-
perform other economies where assets and management are competitively matched.  
The implications of our findings are potentially important for other settings in which 
families play an active role in firm decision-making. La Porta et al. (1999) have documented that 
families are the most common large shareholder of publicly traded corporations; and private firms 
are commonly associated to one family. Our results indicate that controlling families that enjoy in 
the private benefits of control can endorse decisions that might be inferior for other stakeholders.  
Finally, our findings could also be interpreted as supportive evidence against 
primogeniture rules in inheritances.   
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TABLE I. FIRM CHARACTERISTICS BY TYPE OF CEO SUCCESSION 
 
Chief executive officer (CEO) successions are classified into two groups: family, when the entering CEO is related by 
blood or marriage to the departing CEO, unrelated, otherwise. Ln assets is the natural logarithm of the total book value 
of assets in Danish Krone. EBIT / Assets is the ratio of operating (ordinary) income to total assets. Net income / Assets  
is the ratio of net income (final result) to total assets. Industry adjusted EBIT / Assets is the difference between EBIT / 
Assets and the average of its four-digit NACE (European industry classification system) benchmark. Firm age is the 
difference between the year of CEO transition and the oldest of: the year of establishment, the year of registration or 
the year of firms’ by-laws. Number of children of departing CEO is the number of children registered in the Danish 
Civil Registration System (CPR). Firm information is from the Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau's (KOB) dataset, 
which is based on firms’ annual reports to the Danish Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs. Standard errors are 
in parentheses and the number of observations in square brackets. 
 
Variable All
(IV)
Ln assets 8.421 8.096 8.569 -0.473 ***
(0.020) (0.0276) (0.026) (0.0379)
[9,511] [2,980] [6,531]
EBIT / Assets 0.045 0.055 0.041 0.014 ***
(0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0032)
[9,511] [2,980] [6,531]
Net income / Assets 0.031 0.037 0.028 0.010 ***
(0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0028)
[9,511] [2,980] [6,531]
Industry adjusted -0.007 0.002 -0.011 0.013 ***
EBIT / Assets (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.003)
[9,511] [2,980] [6,531]
Firm Age 18.091 18.569 17.873 0.696
(0.2106) (0.3357) (0.2657) (0.4281)
[9,511] [2,980] [6,531]
Type of Succession
(III)(II)
Family Unrelated Difference
(I)
 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
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TABLE II. FIRM SUCCESSIONS AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPARTING CEOS 
 
Chief executive officer (CEO) successions are classified into two groups: family, when the entering CEO is related by 
blood or marriage to the departing CEO, unrelated, otherwise. Family successions are further classified as family-children 
successions, when the entering CEO is the child of the departing executive. In Panels (A) to (D) the frequency of family 
and unrelated successions are presented by alternative family characteristics of the departing CEOs: (A) the number of 
children, (B) the number of spouses, (C) by the gender of the first-born child, and (D) the ratio of males to the total number 
of children. CEO successions data are from Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau's (KOB) dataset, which is based on 
firms’ annual reports to the Danish Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs. Family characteristics data are from the 
Danish Civil Registration System (CPR). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
             9,511 2,980     0.313 6,531     0.687 1,229     0.129
A. Number of children:
0              1,253 311        0.248 942        0.752 -        0.000
1              1,419 413        0.291 1,006     0.709 133        0.094
2              4,265 1,307     0.306 2,958     0.694 578        0.136
3              1,994 727        0.365 1,267     0.635 400        0.201
4 or more                 580 222        0.383 358        0.617 118        0.203
Difference (1) minus (0) 0.043 ** 0.094 ***
(0.017) (0.008)
Difference (3) minus (1) 0.074 *** 0.107 ***
(0.016) (0.013)
B. Number of spouses:
0                 820 160        0.195 660        0.805 8            0.010
1              7,534 2,536     0.337 4,998     0.663 1,130     0.150
2 or more              1,157 284        0.246 873        0.755 91          0.079
Difference (2 or more) minus (1) -0.091 *** -0.071 ***
(0.015) (0.011)
C. By gender ratio (male/children):
 < 50 percent              2,743 747        0.272 1,996     0.728 248        0.090
 = 50 percent              2,363 791        0.335 1,572     0.665 359        0.152
 > 50 percent              3,152 1,131     0.359 2,021     0.641 622        0.197
Difference (>50%) minus (< 50%) 0.087 *** 0.107 ***
(0.012) (0.009)
D. By gender of first born child:
Female              3,947 1,129     0.286 2,818     0.714 409        0.104
Male              4,311 1,540     0.357 2,771     0.643 820        0.190
Difference male minus female 0.071 *** 0.087 ***
(0.010) (0.008)
Type of Succession
Description
Family: ChildrenFamily UnrelatedNumber of
Successions
All
 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
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TABLE III. FIRM AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS BY THE GENDER OF THE FIRST CHILD 
OF DEPARTING CEOS 
 
Chief executive officer (CEO) successions are classified by the gender of the first child born to the departing CEO: 
male, when the first-born child was a male and female, if the first-born child was female. Firms where the departing 
CEO had no children are omitted. Ln assets is the natural logarithm of the total book value of assets in Danish Krone. 
EBIT / Assets is the ratio of operating (ordinary) income to total assets. Net income / Assets  is the ratio of net income 
(final result) to total assets. Industry adjusted EBIT / Assets is the difference between EBIT / Assets and the average of 
its four-digit NACE (European industry classification system) benchmark. Firm age is the difference between the year 
of CEO transition and the oldest of: the year of establishment, the year of registration or the year of firms’ by-laws. 
Number of children of departing CEO is the number of children registered in the Danish Civil Registration System 
(CPR) and the number of spouses is calculated using the number of historical marriages registered at the CPR. Firm 
information is from the Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau's (KOB) dataset, which is based on firms’ annual reports 
to the Danish Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs. Standard errors are in parentheses and the number of 
observations in square brackets. 
 
Variable All
(IV)
Ln assets 8.456 8.451 8.461 -0.011
(0.0215) (0.0295) (0.0314) (0.0431)
[8,258] [4,311] [3,947]
EBIT / Assets 0.046 0.045 0.048 -0.003
(0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0033)
[8,258] [4,311] [3,947]
Net income / Assets 0.032 0.030 0.033 -0.003
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0028)
[8,258] [4,311] [3,947]
Industry adjusted -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003
EBIT / Assets [0.0016) [0.0022) [0.0023) [0.0032)
[8,258] [4,311] [3,947]
Firm Age 18.151 18.108 18.198 -0.090
(0.2285) (0.3064) (0.3414) (0.4587)
[8,258] [4,311] [3,947]
Number of children of 2.230 2.240 2.219 0.021
departing CEO (0.0095) (0.0131) (0.0139) (0.0191)
[8,258] [4,311] [3,947]
Number of spouses 1.108 1.102 1.114 -0.012
(0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0073) (0.0098)
[8,258] [4,311] [3,947]
Male Female Difference
(I) (II) (III)
Gender of First Child
 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
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TABLE IV. SUCCESSION DECISIONS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE AROUND CEO TRANSITIONS 
 
Chief executive officer (CEO) successions are classified into two groups: family, when the entering CEO is related by 
blood or marriage to the departing CEO, unrelated, otherwise. Panel A reports average industry adjusted EBIT to Assets 
ratio before (three-year average) and after (three-year average) successions, and differences in these measures around CEO 
transitions. Panel B presents differences (differences in differences (DD)) around CEO transitions (and across succession 
groups) for the three-year averages of the following variables (I) EBIT to assets, (II) Industry adjusted EBIT to assets, (III) 
Industry adjusted net income to assets, and (IV) natural logarithm of assets. The industry adjustment is based on four-digit 
NACE (European industry classification system) benchmarks. In all cases the year of succession is omitted. Data are from 
Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau's (KOB) dataset, which is based on firms’ annual reports to the Danish Ministry of 
Economics and Business Affairs. Standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations in square brackets. 
 
Panel A.  Dependent Variable: Industry-Adjusted Profitability on Assets (EBIT/Assets)
All
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Before -0.0036 0.0062 -0.0080 0.0141 ***
(0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0024)
[9,511] [2,980] [6,531]
After -0.0054 -0.0050 -0.0056 0.0007
(0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0026)
[9,511] [2,980] [6,531]
Difference -0.0019 -0.0111 *** 0.0024 -0.0135 ***
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0029)
Panel B.  Alternative Dependent Variables (Difference-in-differences (DD) analysis)
Differences in 
in-Differences
(IV)
EBIT/Assets -0.0131 *** 0.0031 -0.0162 *** -0.0084 ***
(0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0019)
Ind-Adjusted -0.0111 *** 0.0024 -0.0135 *** -0.0090 ***
EBIT/Assets (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0021)
Ind-Adjusted -0.0104 *** 0.0005 -0.0109 *** -0.0035 **
Net inc/Assets (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0016)
Ln Assets 0.0232 *** 0.0446 *** -0.0214 *** -0.0049 ***
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0015)
(I) (II)
Difference
Type of Transition
Mean Difference- Median DDFamily Unrelated
Type of Succession
Family Unrelated
(III)
   
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
 39
TABLE V. GENDER OF THE FIRST-BORN CHILD AND FAMILY SUCCESSIONS (FIRST STAGE)  
 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the incoming CEO is related by blood or marriage to the 
departing executive, zero otherwise. Gender of the first-born child is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-born child of 
the departing CEO is male, 0 if she is female. Number of male children is the number the departing CEOs’ male children 
registered in the Danish Civil Registration System (CPR). Ln assets is the natural log of the book value of assets at the time of 
succession. Firm age is the difference between the year of succession and the oldest of: the year of establishment, the year of 
registration or the year of by-laws. Industry adjusted EBIT to Assets ratio based on four-digit NACE (European industry 
classification system) benchmarks the year prior the CEO transition. CEO successions and firm data are from 
Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau's (KOB) dataset, which is based on firms’ annual reports to the Danish Ministry of 
Economics and Business Affairs. Family characteristics data are from the Danish Civil Registration System (CPR). Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Explanatory Variable
Gender of the first born child 0.0712 *** 0.0719 *** 0.0709 *** 0.0253 **
is male (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0125)
Number of male children 0.0542 *** 0.0453 ***
(0.0057) (0.0070)
Ln assets -0.0301 *** -0.0344 *** -0.0344 ***
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Firm age 0.0011 *** 0.0011 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Industry adjusted EBIT/Assets, t=-1 0.2373 *** 0.2349 ***
(0.0352) (0.0349)
Year controls No No Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 48.25 88.79 29.81 31.62 32.93
R 2 0.006 0.011 0.029 0.036 0.041
Number of observations 8,258 8,258 8,258 8,258 8,258
Dependent Variable: Family CEO
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
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Explanatory Variable
Gender of the first born child 
is male
Ln assets
Firm age
Industry adjusted EBIT/Assets *
Year controls
Industry adjusted profitability
Number of observations
Dependent Variable: Changes in Profitability
TABLE VI. GENDER OF THE FIRST-BORN CHILD AND CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE 
(REDUCED FORM)  
 
The dependent variable is the change in firm profitability around CEO successions. Firm profitability is defined as 
industry adjusted EBIT / assets, defined as the difference between EBIT / assets and the average of its four-digit NACE 
(European industry classification system) benchmark. Changes in profitability are computed as the difference between 
the average three-year post-succession profitability minus the three-year average before transition. The year of 
succession is omitted. Gender of the first-born child is an indicator variable equal to one if the first-born child of the 
departing CEO is male, 0 if she is female. Ln assets is the natural log of the book value of assets at the time of 
succession. Firm age is the difference between the year of succession and the oldest of: the year of establishment, the 
year of registration or the year of by-laws. Industry adjusted EBIT to Assets ratio based on four-digit NACE (European 
industry classification system) benchmarks the year prior the CEO transition. CEO successions and firm data are from 
Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau's (KOB) dataset, which is based on firms’ annual reports to the Danish Ministry 
of Economics and Business Affairs. Family characteristics data are from the Danish Civil Registration System (CPR). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
-0.0085 *** -0.0083 *** -0.0093 *** -0.007 **
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0028)
-0.0013 * -0.0006
(0.0007) (0.0007)
0.000
(0.0001)
, t=-1 -0.2996 **
(0.0124)
No Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
8,258 8,258 8,258 8,258
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
 
TABLE VII. FIRM PERFORMANCE AND FAMILY SUCCESSIONS: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES  
 
Family CEO in an indicator variable equal to one when the entering CEO is related by blood or marriage to the departing CEO, zero otherwise. The instrumental variables are: the 
gender of the first-born child of a departing CEO (1=male, 0 =female) in all columns and additionally, the number of male children of the departing CEO in Column V, and the 
total number of children in Column VI. The dependent variable is the change in firm profitability around CEO successions. Firm profitability is defined as EBIT / Assets or the 
ratio of operating (ordinary) income to the book value of total assets minus the average of its four-digit NACE (European industry classification system) benchmark. Changes in 
profitability are computed as the difference between the average three-year post-succession profitability minus the three-year average before transition. The year of succession is 
omitted. Ln assets is the natural log of the book value of assets at the time of succession. Firm age is the difference between the year of succession and the oldest of: the year of 
establishment, the year of registration or the year of by-laws. Industry adjusted EBIT to Assets ratio based on four-digit NACE (European industry classification system) 
benchmarks the year prior the CEO transition. CEO successions and firm data are from Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau's (KOB) dataset, which is based on firms’ annual 
reports to the Danish Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs. Family characteristics data are from the Danish Civil Registration System (CPR). Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses in Columns (I) to (VI). Estimated coefficients in Columns (III) through (VI) are from a two-stage least square regression. Results in Column VII are from an ordinary 
least square first stage and a median second stage regression; standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Explanatory Variable OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV
Family CEO -0.0083 *** -0.0078 *** -0.1157 *** -0.0989 ** -0.0637 ** -0.0695 ** -0.0649 **
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0430) (0.0411) (0.0292) (0.0318) (0.0322)
Ln assets -0.0011 * -0.0009 -0.004 ** -0.0028 ** -0.0030 ** -0.0016
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Industry adjusted EBIT/Assets, t-1 -0.3011 *** -0.2981 *** -0.2762 *** -0.2847 *** -0.2833 *** -0.3037 ***
(0.0115) (0.0124) (0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0112)
Firm age 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,511 8,258 8,258 8,258 8,258 8,258 8,258
(V) (VI) (VII)
Dependent Variable: Changes in Profitability around CEO Successions
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
  
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
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TABLE VIII. ALTERNATIVE WINDOWS OF ANALYSIS AND SUB-SAMPLES 
 
Family CEO in an indicator variable equal to one when the entering CEO is related by blood or marriage to the departing CEO, zero otherwise. The instrumental variable is the 
gender of the first-born child of the departing CEO (1=male, 0 =female). The dependent variable is the change in firm profitability around CEO successions. Firm profitability 
is defined as EBIT / Assets or the ratio of operating (ordinary) income to the book value of total assets minus the average of its four-digit NACE (European industry 
classification system) benchmark. Pre-transition change in profitability in Column I is computed as the difference between the average three-year profitability after year t=-3 
minus the three-year average before, where the year t=-3 is omitted. Transition changes in profitability in Columns II, IV, V, VI and VII are computed as the difference 
between the average three-year post-succession profitability minus the three-year average before transition, where the year of succession is omitted. Post-transition change in 
profitability in Column III is computed as the difference between the average three-year profitability after year t=+3 minus the three-year average before, where the year t=+3 
is omitted. The number of observations in Column I, II and III reflect the number of firms with available data for the relevant analysis. Column IV reports results for firms 
where the departing CEO’s age was between 55 and 65 years of age. Column V (VI) reports results for firms whose departing CEO left at a younger (older) age than the 
median age of the sample. Column VII presents results for observations where the departing CEO died at the time of transition. All specifications include the following 
controls (estimated coefficients are not reported): Ln assets, the natural log of the book value of assets at time t. Firm age is the difference between year t and the oldest of: the 
year of establishment, the year of registration or the year of by-laws. Industry adjusted EBIT to assets at time t=-1, defined as the lagged firm industry adjusted profitability. 
CEO successions and firm data are from Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau's (KOB) dataset, which is based on firms’ annual reports to the Danish Ministry of Economics 
and Business Affairs. Family characteristics data are from the Danish Civil Registration System (CPR). All results are from a two-stage least square regression. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Family CEO 0.0074 -0.0989 ** -0.0232 -0.1003 ** -0.1401 -0.0869 ** -0.1441
(0.0484) (0.0411) (0.0793) (0.0404) (0.1008) (0.0410) (0.1314)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry adjusted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
profitability
Number of observations 4,572 8,258 3,078 2,776 4,020 4,238 828
CEO DeathAge ≥ Median
(VI)
Transition Transition Age (55,65)
Departing CEO
Age < Median
(V)(I) (II) (III) (VII)(IV)
Dependent Variable: Changes in Profitability 
Pre- Transition Post- Departing Departing CEO Departing CEO
 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
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TABLE IX. INTERACTIONS 
 
Family CEO in an indicator variable equal to one when the entering CEO is related by blood or marriage to the departing CEO, zero otherwise. The instrumental variable is the 
gender of the first-born child of the departing CEO (1=male, 0 =female). The dependent variable is the change in firm profitability around CEO successions. Firm profitability is 
defined as EBIT / assets or the ratio of operating (ordinary) income to the book value of total assets minus the average of its four-digit NACE (European industry classification 
system) benchmark. Changes in profitability are computed as the difference between the average three-year post-succession profitability minus the three-year average before 
transition. The year of CEO succession is omitted. Family CEO-prevalent (board-prevalent) industry is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry is above the median in 
terms of prevalence of family CEO transitions (the share of family members in firms’ boards), zero otherwise. Mature industry is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry is 
below the median in terms of production growth between 1990 and 2002, zero otherwise. Dynamic entry industry is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry is below the 
median in terms of firm age, zero otherwise. R&D-intensive industry is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry is above the median in terms of spending in research and 
development relative to the value of production, zero otherwise. Concentrated industry is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in 1992 
(asset shares) is above the median, zero otherwise. All specifications include the following controls (estimated coefficients are not reported): Ln assets, firm age and industry 
adjusted EBIT to assets at time t=-1. CEO successions and firm data are from Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau's (KOB) dataset, which is based on firms’ annual reports to 
the Danish Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs. Family characteristics data are from the Danish Civil Registration System (CPR). Data from production growth and R&D 
intensity by industry is from the OECD. All results are from two-stage least square regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Family CEO -0.1620 ** -0.1204 ** -0.1218 *** -0.0880 ** -0.0801 -0.0906 **
(0.0700) (0.0568) (0.0467) (0.0388) (0.0657) (0.0387)
"Family CEO-prevalent" industry * family CEO 0.0762 **
(0.0356)
"Family board-prevalent" industry * family CEO 0.0323
(0.0249)
"Mature" industry * family CEO 0.0383 ***
(0.0129)
"Dynamic entry" industry * family CEO -0.0297 **
(0.0139)
"R&D-intensive" industry * family CEO -0.0763 **
(0.0299)
Concentrated industry * family CEO -0.0367 **
(0.0182)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry adjusted profitability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,258 8,227 7,692 2,776 2,106 8,258
(VI)
Dependent Variable: Changes in Profitability 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.    
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